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Abstract 13 
Two key international policy processes have been developed to combat illegal logging and 14 
promote the contribution of forests to climate change mitigation in developing countries: the 15 
European Union’s Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 16 
and its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), and the United Nations Framework 17 
Convention on Climate Change policy on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 18 
Degradation (REDD+). The implementation of these policies raises concerns about 19 
unintended adverse effects on the environment and local peoples’ livelihoods. To prevent 20 
such effects, both processes involve developing country-level safeguards, so that they ‘do no 21 
harm’. This paper presents (i) a comparison of the social safeguards of the FLEGT-VPA and 22 
REDD+ processes and an explanation of their commonalities and differences, and (ii) an 23 
exploration of the potential synergies and the challenges to realizing them. The three main 24 
research methods used in the study were semi-structured interviews, content analysis of 25 
policy documents, and focus group discussions with local communities and indigenous 26 
peoples in south and east Cameroon. Our analysis shows that whereas FLEGT-VPA includes 27 
legality-based safeguards with legally binding monitoring and reporting obligations, REDD+ 28 
adopts a right-based approach to safeguards. Potential synergies between the two 29 
approaches were identified. The synergies lie in the participatory nature of the process of 30 
designing benefit sharing mechanisms, strengthening forest and land tenure, and defining the 31 
criteria and indicators in FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ safeguards. However, realizing the synergies 32 
is challenging, given the existing political economy of Cameroon. 33 
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1. Introduction 36 
Deforestation and forest degradation are the key causes of an increasing reduction of the 37 
world's forest and important contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Achard et al., 38 
2014), with illegal logging being an important cause of deforestation and forest degradation 39 
(e.g. through harvesting premature forest or harvesting more trees than legally allowed), 40 
thereby contributing to GHG emissions (Tacconi, 2007).  41 
Two major international policy processes have been established to address the problem of 42 
illegal logging, and of deforestation and forest degradation: the European Union’s (EU) Action 43 
Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and the United Nations 44 
policy on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). The FLEGT 45 
Action Plan focuses on the timber trade and the enforcement of forest laws and regulations 46 
as a way to combat illegal logging (European Commission, 2003). Bilaterally negotiated 47 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with timber-producing countries that export to the 48 
EU are a major component of the Action Plan (European Commission, 2003). REDD+ is a 49 
multilateral initiative under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 50 
(UNFCCC) to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, as a way to reduce GHG emissions 51 
from forest and land use. REDD+ is based on the concept of incentivizing developing countries 52 
to reduce emissions in the forest and land-use sector (Angelsen et al., 2012). In parallel to the 53 
development of REDD+ under the UNFCCC, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 54 
Facility (FCPF) and the UN-REDD Programme have been supporting developing countries in 55 
their efforts to “get ready” for REDD+. FLEGT and REDD+ are two distinct policy processes, 56 
operating under different design and implementation strategies. However, both aspire to 57 
bring about a positive change in governance (Angelsen et al., 2012; European Commission, 58 
2003), and both face significant and similar challenges in implementation (Corbera & 59 
Schroeder, 2011; Ramcilovic-Suominen & Hansen, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). 60 
Despite the implementation challenges, there is a strong commitment to further the 61 
development and implementation of the processes at the global, national and subnational 62 
levels. This commitment of the two processes lie not only in the stated policy goals, but also 63 
in the anticipation that their effective implementation will promote sustainable forest 64 
management, generate non-carbon benefits, and address worries related to poor 65 
governance, land tenure, biodiversity conservation, effective participation, benefit sharing 66 
and poverty alleviation (McDermott et al., 2012; Ros-Tonen et al., 2013). This is why 67 
stakeholders have pushed for the incorporation in these policy processes of so-called 68 
safeguards, addressing both environmental and social issues (Jagger et al., 2014; McDermott 69 
et al., 2012). While an emerging body of literature has focused on the interactions between 70 
FLEGT and REDD+ more generally (Broekhoven & Wit, 2014; Ochieng et al., 2013; Tegegne et 71 
al., 2014), a comparatively smaller amount of research has focused on the relationships 72 
among the social safeguards in those two processes (McDermott et al., 2012). This is 73 
important, because in order to ensure that a country safeguard system is developed and 74 
implemented efficiently, synergies with other safeguard systems of related processes in the 75 
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country should be explored (Jagger et al., 2014; McDermott et al., 2012; Rey et al., 2013). 76 
Furthermore, consideration of the synergies among the safeguards of related processes can 77 
avoid duplication of efforts and enhance economies of scale. Against this backdrop, this study 78 
addressed the following questions: 79 
 What are the commonalities and differences between the social safeguard 80 
approaches of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon, and how can these similarities and 81 
differences be explained? 82 
 What are the potential synergies between the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ social 83 
safeguards, and what challenges stand in the way of realizing these synergies?  84 
It is hoped that the comparison of safeguard approaches will contribute to learning, 85 
improvements and further guidance on the development and implementation of safeguards 86 
in the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes. Moreover, before one is able to develop synergies 87 
between related policies, understanding commonalities and differences and the reasons for 88 
the overlaps are necessary (Duguma et al., 2014; Gehring & Oberthür, 2009; McDermott et 89 
al., 2012). Such analysis is particular necessary to identify and inform relevant stakeholders 90 
about aspects of environmental and social challenges where the processes can (not) work 91 
together and why (Rey et al., 2013). The early lessons learnt in Cameroon can be beneficial to 92 
the 15 countries that are currently negotiating or implementing a FLEGT-VPA and 93 
participating in REDD+, and help in the development of the theoretical debate on social 94 
safeguards.  95 
Section 2 introduces the conceptual dimensions of social safeguards and section 3 presents 96 
overview of the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes in Cameroon and the research methods. 97 
Section 4 presents the research findings and section 5 discusses the key findings of the study. 98 
Finally, section 6 outlines the main concluding remarks. 99 
2. Conceptual framework: Approaches to social safeguards 100 
The concept of social safeguards in general has its origins in the World Bank’s safeguards 101 
policies and in the United Nations (UN) system in the 1980s (Hall, 2007). The World Bank’s 102 
approach – which was later also adopted by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) – focuses 103 
on doing no harm. This approach is also known as the mitigation approach (McDermott et al., 104 
2012), so as to indicate its reactive – as opposed to proactive – nature. It focuses on 105 
addressing adverse impacts resulting from investment and development activities (EMG-106 
UNEP, 2010), and encompasses aspects such as working conditions, pollution, health and 107 
security (Ros-Tonen et al., 2013). The UN’s approach to social safeguards pursues the idea of 108 
preventing undue harm (EMG-UNEP, 2010), thus taking a proactive stand. It puts greater 109 
emphasis on the promotion of rights and social benefits, and is thus also referred as the right-110 
based approach (McDermott et al., 2012; Ros-Tonen et al., 2013).  111 
In addition to these two approaches, social safeguards have recently been revisited in the 112 
policy discourse surrounding REDD+. Countries undertaking REDD+ activities are requested to 113 
develop country-level approaches that enable them to respond to the requirements outlined 114 
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in the recent UNFCCC agreements concerning social and environmental risks. The provisions 115 
of social and environmental safeguards in REDD+ are explained in a number of decisions. First, 116 
the Cancun Agreement (1/CP.16) acknowledges the need to address national forest 117 
governance shortcomings and mitigate any potential adverse social and environmental 118 
effects that could prevent REDD+ from achieving its long-term goals (UNFCCC, 2011). Second, 119 
in 2011, the UNFCCC COP 17 in Durban set up a Safeguard Information System (SIS) for Parties 120 
to provide information about how all safeguards, as referred to in the Cancun Agreement 121 
(appendix I), are being addressed and respected. Third, in 2013, UNFCCC COP 19 in Warsaw 122 
included the safeguards in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. Finally, two years later, COP 123 
21 in Paris (Decision 17/CP.21) referred to the need for further guidance when 124 
communicating how safeguards are being addressed and respected by REDD+ countries. The 125 
SIS will make countries eligible for result-based payments, based on reporting on the delivery 126 
of social and environmental safeguards. 127 
Our conceptual framework consists of three parts. For the first part, namely our analysis of 128 
the character of the various safeguards, we use the following typology by Arhin (2014), which 129 
is more specific than other categorizations: 130 
 Preventive safeguards – refer to ‘doing no harm’ to local communities. 131 
 Mitigative safeguards – refer to minimizing the negative distributional impact of 132 
measures on local communities and their livelihoods. 133 
 Promotive safeguards – refer to ‘doing something better’ to provide opportunities and 134 
spaces for forest-dependent communities to contribute to decision making, improve 135 
their livelihoods and benefit from the measures. 136 
 Transformative safeguards – aim to pursue a radical shift in underlying assumptions and 137 
narratives to increase indigenous peoples’ (IPs) and communities’ access to and control 138 
of benefits. 139 
The second part of our conceptual framework was developed based on the following bodies 140 
of literature that analyse key social issues and risks in the context of natural resource 141 
governance, including decentralization reforms, payment for ecosystem services (PES) and 142 
community-based conservation (e.g. Awono et al., 2013; Blom et al., 2010; Chhatre et al., 143 
2012; Chomba et al., 2016; Dunlop & Corbera, 2016; Hayes & Persha, 2010; Sunderlin et al., 144 
2014). The following are the most prominent social risks and concerns associated with the 145 
implementation of forest policies: (i) tenure insecurity (Awono et al., 2013; Cerbu, Sonwa, & 146 
Pokorny, 2013; Hajjar, 2014; Mbatu, 2015; Nkemnyi et al., 2016; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Willis 147 
et al., 2016), (ii) inadequate avenues for local participation (Awono et al., 2013; Lawlor et al., 148 
2013; Lesniewska & McDermott, 2014; Wodschow et al., 2016), (iii) inequitable benefit 149 
sharing (Cerbu et al., 2013; Lawlor et al., 2013; Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014; Mbatu, 150 
2015; Sunderlin et al., 2014) and (iv) adverse impacts on local livelihoods (Eba’a Atyi et al., 151 
2013; Lesniewska & McDermott, 2014; van Heeswijk & Turnhout, 2013; Wiersum & Elands, 152 
2013).  153 
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Furthermore, based on the works of one of the authors of this paper (Fobissie et al., 2012; 154 
Fobissie, 2014), which focus on forest governance and social safeguards in Cameroon – we 155 
introduced an additional, important aspect to be considered in the context of social 156 
safeguards in REDD+: free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Building on these literatures, 157 
we distilled the following core aspects of social safeguards:  158 
 Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and participation: FPIC lays down the principle to 159 
secure the full and effective participation of IPs and communities prior to any proposed 160 
interventions (e.g. a REDD+ project). Participation was analysed using Arnstein's (1969) 161 
ladder of participation, differentiating between manipulative, passive, functional, 162 
interactive participation, participation by consultation, participation for materials 163 
incentives and self-mobilization.  164 
 Forest and land tenure: Tenure was analysed using the concept of ‘bundle of rights’, 165 
which includes access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights (for 166 
detailed definitions of these rights, see Schlager & Ostrom (1992). 167 
 Social benefits and benefit sharing mechanisms (BSMs), including the impacts on local 168 
livelihoods: For BSMs, we applied the analytical parameters defined by Fobissie et al. 169 
(2014) and Lindhjem et al. (2011), who identified two dimensions of a benefit sharing 170 
arrangement: the vertical distribution of benefits between national and local 171 
stakeholders, and the horizontal sharing of benefits between and within a community.  172 
BSMs should be tailored to local conditions and needs and fulfil effectiveness, efficiency 173 
and equity criteria (see Assembe-mvondo et al., 2015; Chomba et al., 2016). 174 
The third part of our framework focuses on monitoring and reporting commitments. A 175 
safeguard system requires a verifiable compliance component to ensure its effectiveness. The 176 
compliance component of a safeguard system could include effective monitoring and 177 
reporting systems, dispute resolution mechanisms and non-compliance mechanisms. In this 178 
study, we paid particular attention to and compared the monitoring and reporting obligations 179 
under the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes. The monitoring and reporting system is basically 180 
meant to provide information about how the safeguards are being addressed and respected. 181 
3. Research design: case study and methods 182 
3.1. Introducing the case study: The Cameroonian VPA and REDD+ processes 183 
Cameroon is renowned for its biodiversity and 42% of the country is covered by forest 184 
(COMIFAC, 2013). However, the country is facing an increased rate of deforestation and forest 185 
degradation, and recent studies have reported that it will soon experience even higher rates 186 
of deforestation (Tegegne et al., 2016). Cameroon is currently engaged in both the EU FLEGT-187 
VPA and REDD+. The processes are managed by two ministries: the Ministry of Forests 188 
(MINFOF) leads the VPA process, and the Ministry of Environment (MINEPDED) is responsible 189 
for overseeing the REDD+ process. The VPA between Cameroon and the EU was signed in 190 
October 2010 and ratified into Cameroonian law in August 2011. Several institutes have been 191 
set up to negotiate and implement the VPA process. The Joint Implementation Council (JIC) 192 
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was created to oversee the VPA implementation, and is composed of two bodies: Committé 193 
Conjoint de Suivi (CCS) and the Council. The parties to the agreement decide who should 194 
participate in CCS meetings. Cameroon has included civil society organizations (CSOs) and 195 
indigenous peoples (IPs) and communities in recent CCS meetings. To guide and assess the 196 
implementation of the VPA, Cameroon established a National Monitoring Committee (NMC). 197 
This NMC has a fixed membership comprising representatives of the Prime Minister's office, 198 
the National Assembly, five government ministries, CSOs, IPs, the private sector and people 199 
who depend on communal forests. Cameroon has been in the implementation phase of the 200 
VPA process since 2011; that is, it is developing a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) 201 
and methods of impact monitoring, and implementing transparency commitments.  202 
Concerning the country’s involvement in and efforts to benefit from REDD+, Cameroon has 203 
been engaged in two main REDD+ initiatives: the FCPF (since September 2010) and the UN-204 
REDD Programme (since November 2011), with the FCPF playing the main role in the national 205 
REDD+ Readiness process. Cameroon’s Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) was validated in 206 
2008 and the national REDD+ Readiness Plan (R-PP) was approved by the policy board of FCPF 207 
in 2013. Several institutes have been designed to follow up on the development and 208 
implementation of the country’s REDD+ strategy. The REDD+ steering committee (the 209 
decision making body for the REDD+ process) consists of 19 members, namely 14 210 
representatives from the government, one from CSOs, one from IPs and one from the private 211 
sector, and two representatives elected by MINNEPED. The Technical Secretariat is the 212 
operational body of the REDD+ process. It is composed of the UNFCCC focal point, the 213 
National REDD+ coordinator and a representative from the MINFOF. At the time of this 214 
research, Cameroon was in the readiness phase of the REDD+ process, that is, it was assessing 215 
drivers of deforestation, working on capacity building, and elaborating the national REDD+ 216 
strategy and Emission Reduction Program Idea Note (ER-PIN).  217 
Several REDD+ projects and REDD+ related PES projects in Cameroon are at the development 218 
or implementation stage. These projects offer on-the-ground platforms for testing and 219 
learning activities that can be used to inform the design and implementation of national-level 220 
REDD+ actions. After discussions with the proponents of various REDD+ and PES projects, we 221 
decided to focus on two of the most advanced forest carbon PES projects, namely the 222 
Community PES and Ngoyla-Mintom REDD+ projects. Both projects were developed in 223 
accordance with the pro-community Plan Vivo system and standard for avoiding 224 
deforestation and forest degradation. They were also implemented within the framework of 225 
community forestry, designated by the 1994 forestry law of Cameroon. One of the projects 226 
was developed by the Centre for Environment and Development (CED) and Bioclimate, and 227 
implemented in two community forests: Nkolenyeng Community forest (which is dominated 228 
by Baka indigenous peoples) in the east, and Nomedjoh Community Forest (which is 229 
dominated by Bantu-Fang farming peoples) in the south (Figure 1). The second project 230 
(Ngoyla-Mintom REDD+ project) was funded by the European Union and implemented by 231 
WWF Cameroon in four community forests dominated by Bantu peoples in the south of 232 
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Cameroon. The general forest types at the two project sites are mixed evergreen and 233 
deciduous humid forests. However, the forests are under serious pressure due to numerous 234 
mining explorations, the development of the cross-border railway between Cameroon, Gabon 235 
and the Republic of Congo, industrial logging, and immigration linked to these economic 236 
activities (Willis et al., 2016). In this context of economic development, securing the full rights 237 
of indigenous peoples and local communities to have complete access to the forests and to 238 
subsistence farming is a major challenge. 239 
[Figure 1 about here] 240 
3.2. Methods 241 
The data collection for this study was carried out following a three-step approach. First, an 242 
extensive review of scientific and grey literature was undertaken, including official and policy 243 
documents related to FLEGT-VPA, REDD+ and safeguard approaches. An overview of the key 244 
policy documents reviewed is presented in Table 1. The literature review and document 245 
analysis were also used to develop questions for the subsequent steps, namely an interview 246 
survey and a protocol for focus group discussions.  247 
Second, semi-structured expert interviews were conducted by the first author during a three-248 
month stay in Cameroon in late 2015. Semi-structured interviews are suitable for gathering 249 
qualitative information about, for example, stakeholders’ perceptions of processes. The 250 
interviewees were selected from various types of organizations using purposeful sampling 251 
techniques (see Table 2). The interviews were conducted face-to-face and were intended to 252 
capture different aspects of social safeguards, as distilled from the conceptual framework. 253 
Each of the 35 interviews lasted for about 1 hour and was recorded with the consent of the 254 
interviewee. In addition, two Skype interviews were conducted in February and March 2016 255 
with important experts who had been abroad during the fieldwork. A standard list of 256 
questions was applied consistently to all interviewees. All questions were open-ended to 257 
allow the interviewees to express their personal experiences and perceptions of important 258 
issues identified during the review of literature and policy documents, and follow-up 259 
questions were asked for elaboration. Expert interviews were transcribed and analysed for 260 
content. In addition, when common trends and responses emerged, they were analysed 261 
through descriptive statistics to determine the numbers and percentages of the interviewees 262 
sharing any given views and opinions. 263 
Third, six focus group discussions (FGDs) with indigenous peoples (IPs) and local communities 264 
participating in forest carbon PES projects were conducted. Table 3 summarizes the basic 265 
characteristics of the six sampled intervention villages at the project sites. The aim of the FGDs 266 
was to capture IPs’ and local communities’ expectations regarding FPIC and participation in 267 
the PES projects, tenure arrangements and BSMs. FGD participants were purposefully 268 
selected (Bedford and Burgess, 2001). The groups comprised village elders, village chiefs, 269 
representatives from the forest entity, and women, men and youth groups in the community. 270 
The discussions were transcribed and analysed for content. 271 
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Table 1. Overview of key policy documents reviewed. 273 
Document title Prepared by Publication 
year 
Reference 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT): 
Proposal for an Action Plan 
European Commission 2003 European Commission, 
2003 
FLEGT briefing notes: Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade 
European Commission 2007 European Commission, 
2007 
FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement between Cameroon 
and the European Union 
European Commission  and 
Cameroon 
2010 Cameroon VPA, 2010 
Guidelines for developing legality definitions in FLEGT 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements 
European Forest Institute 2012 EFI, 2012 
REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal Cameroon Ministry of the Environment, the 
Nature Protection and 
Sustainable Development 
(Cameroon) 
2013 MINEPDED, 2013 
Operational Guidelines for Obtaining Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent in REDD+ Initiatives in Cameroon Including 
Principles, Criteria and Indicators. 
Ministry of Environment, Nature 
Protection and Sustainable 
Development (Cameroon) 
2015 MINEPDED, 2015a 
The World Bank Operations Manual World Bank 2005 World Bank, 2005 
Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement World Bank and UN-REDD 2012 FCPF UNREDD, 2012 
Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) FCPF 2010 FCPF UNREDD, 2010 
Guidelines and Generic Terms of Reference (ToR) for an 
SESAs and ESMF 
FCPF 2010 FCPF, 2010 
UNFCCC Cancun agreement UNFCCC 2011 UNFCCC, 2011 
Cameroon ER-PIN draft document MINEPDED 2015 MINEPDED, 2015b 
 274 
 275 
Table 2. Expert interviews: categories and number of interviewees. 276 
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Categories of interviewees Organizations Number 
interviewed 
National governmental organizations Ministry of Forests (MINFOF); Ministry of the Environment, the Protection of 
Nature and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED)  
10 
International organizations 
(governmental and non-governmental) 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR); Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); World Bank; World Wide Fund for 
nature; International Union for Conservation of Nature; Wildlife Conservation 
Society; Environmental Investigation Agency  
11 
National Civil society organizations National REDD+ and Climate Change Platform; Centre for Environment and 
Development (CED); Centre for Assistance to Justice and Animation for 
Development (CAJAD); Forest and Rural Development (FODER); Fondation 
Camerounaise Terre Vivante (FCTV)  
14 
National academic institutes University of Yaoundé I; University of Dschang 2 
 277 
Table 3. Basic characteristics of the six sampled villages in project sites. 278 
 PES project1 REDD+ Ngoyla-Mintom Project2 
Village Nomendjoh Nkolenyeng Etekessang Zoulabot Messok-Messok Ndimako 
Total inhabitants  896 555 212 198 147 186 
Ethnic groups Mainly Baka Bantu (92%), Baka (8%) Bantu only Bantu only Bantu only Baka only 
Total forest area  1942 ha 1042 ha 3135 ha 3254 ha 1480 ha  -3 
Main economic 
activities  
Agriculture labour 
in Bantu fields, 
Hunting, gathering 
NTFPs 
Bantu: Agriculture, logging, 
gathering NTFPs. 
Baka: Agriculture labour in 
Bantu fields, Hunting, 
gathering NTFPs 
Agriculture, logging, gathering NTFPs. Hunting, 
agriculture labour 
in Bantu fields, 
gathering NTFPs 
10 
 
Drivers of forest 
loss 
Expansion of food and cash crops such as plantain, cassava and peanut. Timber exploitation, unsustainable exploitation of 
non-timber forest products (NTFPs) 
1National NGO – CED – is the leading proponent 279 
2WWF lead the REDD+ Ngoyla-Mintom project 280 
3Ndimako is part of the community forestry of Etekessang 281 
 282 
 283 
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4. Results 284 
The results are presented in three sections: (1) proposed social safeguards under the FLEGT-285 
VPA and REDD+; (2) monitoring and reporting requirements; and (3) similarities and 286 
differences between the safeguards of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+.  287 
4.1. Social safeguards under FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ 288 
The FLEGT Action Plan, VPA text (including its annexes) and implementing guidelines are very 289 
brief when it comes to the definition, scope and objectives of social safeguards. The European 290 
Commission (2007) states that key elements to consider in designing and implementing a VPA 291 
are likely to include social safeguards, to minimize adverse impacts on local communities. It 292 
is this aspect that has been adopted in the majority of negotiated VPAs, including that of 293 
Cameroon (see Cameroon VPA, 2010, Art. 17). The concept of social safeguards is not further 294 
elaborated in any of the 11 annexes of the Cameroonian VPA. However, the need to consider 295 
livelihoods is reiterated in several articles (see Cameroon VPA, 2010, Art. 2; 15 and 16). 296 
Furthermore, the legality definition is another part of the VPA where safeguards are 297 
highlighted (EFI, 2012). Cameroon’s legality definition is framed around five criteria, including 298 
social obligations such as compliance with employment, social security and labour laws and 299 
social agreements.  300 
Cameroon is an active member of the World Bank’s FCPF programme and its R-PP outlines 301 
the procedures for the development of Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) 302 
(FCPF, 2010), and adopts preventive and mitigative safeguards. As stated in the R-PP 303 
(MINEPDED, 2013, p. 83) the SESA ’is the approach that allows Cameroon to reduce as much 304 
as possible or to eliminate the possible social and environmental impacts […] during the design 305 
and implementation of the REDD+ strategy or to offset them.’ The R-PP discusses fundamental 306 
questions, such as participation, BSMs and tenure. However, the R-PP does not clearly 307 
describe how SESA will be implemented, and it states that SESA will be based in part on the 308 
criteria and indicators of the VPA (MINEPDED, 2013, p. 86). Table 4 compares and summarizes 309 
the core aspects of social safeguards of the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes.310 
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Table 4. Comparative analysis of the social safeguards of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon 311 
Aspects of 
social 
safeguards 
FLEGT-VPA REDD+ 
FPIC VPA text makes no reference to FPIC 
Indeginous peoples and communities 
have a pre-emptive right to refuse 
allocation and claim their rights. 
Adopted and validated FPIC guidelines 
FPIC requirements have not been met 
in the field 
Participation of 
IPs and 
communities 
Requires ’consultation’ rather than 
’participation’, which does not by itself 
ensure full and effective participation 
The CCS1 has included IPs and 
communities in recent meetings  
Consultation is the defining form of 
participation  
Consultation of indigenous and local 
communities is a right 
Land and forest 
tenure 
Promotes recognition of access or use 
rights; does not extend to full ownership 
rights for IPs and communities 
There is no mention of IPs and 
communities 
Recognizes user and access rights, but 
not full ownership 
Recognizes the conflicts between state 
and customary right, but does not 
provide any guidance 
Social benefits 
and benefit 
sharing 
Acknowledges the need for vertical 
benefit sharing but provides no guidance 
Recognizes the need to consider the 
livelihoods of IPs and communities 
Plan to develop vertical and horizontal 
benefit sharing mechanisms  
The planned benefit sharing 
mechanism will have effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity problems 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
commitments 
VPA has a legally-binding commitment to 
monitor and report  
VPA plans to meet the reporting 
obligations by making the monitoring 
reports available online 
The R-PP makes provisions for the 
monitoring and reporting of social 
safeguards through the 
institutionalization of SESA 
1CCS (Committé Conjoint de Suivi) is one of the two bodies of Joint Implementation Council of the VPA 312 
process in Cameroon. 313 
4.1.1. FPIC and participation  314 
The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, including indigenous peoples 315 
(IPs) and local communities, is essential for achieving effective and sustainable 316 
implementation of FLEGT-VPA (Wodschow et al., 2016) and REDD+ (FCPF-UNREDD, 2012). All 317 
stakeholders involved in, affected by or interested in the processes should actively engage at 318 
all level of the processes. ‘In order for REDD+ and FLEGT to achieve their policy goals, the 319 
processes should have long-term planning and monitoring to ensure active participation of IPs 320 
and local communities, who have an important role to play in sustainable management of 321 
natural resources’ noted an interviewee. The VPA text states that IPs and communities will be 322 
regularly consulted on the implementation of the VPA through the NMC (Cameroon VPA, 323 
2010, Annex III (a, b)). Nonetheless, the VPA fails to specify the roles and powers of IPs and 324 
communities in decision making and the implementation of the VPA process. Sixty per cent 325 
of interviewees, mainly from CSOs, interpreted the use of the word ‘consult’ in the VPA text 326 
to mean that only a weak level of non-state actors’ involvement in the VPA process is 327 
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required. This could also imply that consultation is the defining form of participation during 328 
VPA implementation in Cameroon, and hence not as many steps up Arnstein's (1969) ladder 329 
as it could be. An interviewee from a national CSO stated that ‘what we are witnessing in 330 
Cameroon’s forest sector is the decreasing opportunities for multi-stakeholder participation 331 
and an increasing influence of the state in the implementation of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+’. This 332 
contradicts the expectation of IPs and communities. We found across the six FGDs that IPs 333 
and communities would like to have a partnership form of participation (in FLEGT-VPA and 334 
REDD+ processes) that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with project 335 
proponents and the government. 336 
The Cameroon REDD+ policy documents provide non-state actors with an opportunity to 337 
participate in decision making. However, a closer look at the current composition of the 338 
REDD+ steering committee revealed the weak representation of CSOs and IPs during decision 339 
making. Representatives from CSOs, IPs, the private sector and elected representatives make 340 
up only a quarter of the members of the steering committee, whereas decision making by the 341 
committee is done through a majority vote (two thirds of the members), at the expense of 342 
consensus (MINEPDED, 2013). As noted by the majority of interviewees (75%) and FGDs, this 343 
offers non-state actors only a very slim chance of making their concerns heard, implying that 344 
consultation is the defining form of participation during REDD+ implementation in Cameroon. 345 
Such decision making may not help Cameroon to fully and easily address the Cancun 346 
safeguards requirements and adhere to the FCPF and UN-REDD joint guidelines on the 347 
participation of stakeholders (FCPF-UNREDD, 2012), which require the full and effective 348 
involvement of IPs and communities.  349 
Although the VPA process does not specifically require FPIC during the allocation of forest 350 
concessions, in 2014 the Cameroon government elaborated and validated a national REDD+ 351 
FPIC guideline document (MINEPDED, 2014). Thirty out of 37 interviewees (80%) and 352 
participants in the FDGs stated that although the FPIC guide is a step towards the effective 353 
attainment of decision making power by IPs and communities, its implementation remains an 354 
important challenge. For instance, in 2015 the government failed to comply with its own 355 
REDD+ FPIC principles during the preparation of the Cameroon ER-PIN. This assertion 356 
corroborates similar findings by Carodenuto & Fobissie (2015). During the fieldwork it was 357 
observed that the requirement that FPIC should be obtained had not been met in the two 358 
projects examined in this study. ‘Most of the meetings during the project design did not take 359 
our traditional calendar into account and the meetings were not conducted in our indigenous 360 
Baka language. The project proponents also failed to provide us with relevant information in 361 
advance’ (an FGD participant in Ndimako village). That said, our analysis shows that 362 
consultation is the most dominant form of participation in the design and implementation of 363 
safeguard systems of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon. 364 
4.1.2. Land and forest tenure 365 
Clarifying land and forest tenure is crucial to identifying natural resource rights holders, who 366 
should thus participate in decision making processes, and those who are entitled to receive 367 
14 
 
FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ benefits. Tenure basically refers to the relationships, systems and rules 368 
that determine rights to land and forest resources. Tenure rights can range from use right to 369 
exclusion and alienation rights. Their position in the spectrum of tenure rights can greatly 370 
affect the ability and motivation of IPs and local communities to manage natural resources 371 
sustainably. In this light, the Cameroon VPA makes explicit mention of the need to recognize 372 
and respect customary rights (see Cameroon VPA, 2010, Annex VIII). However, such 373 
recognition is mostly limited to access or use rights, and does not extend to full ownership 374 
rights for IPs and communities. This is because during the VPA negotiation there was an 375 
assumption among Cameroonian stakeholders that the basis of the VPA would be in 376 
conformity with existing national legislation, which at the time did not provide for ownership 377 
rights. It was therefore difficult for non-state actors to advocate for and have full ownership 378 
in the VPA text. Furthermore, 21 out of 37 interviewees (55%) and participants in the FGDs 379 
asserted that the Cameroon VPA and REDD+ processes lack clear procedures for securing land 380 
and forest tenure for IPs and communities. 381 
The Cancan Agreement acknowledge the importance of tenure issues but there is no further 382 
elaboration, referring only to national laws and sovereignty (See UNFCCC, 2011, Art. 72). The 383 
Cameroon R-PP (MINEPDED, 2013, p. 47) also highlights tenure insecurity as a concern and 384 
acknowledges the conflicts between customary and formal law. The R-PP (p. 45) states that 385 
‘the [country’s] law governing land issues are clear: the laws take precedence over customary 386 
right’. The R-PP mainly refers to 1974 land tenure and 1994 forestry laws, which do not 387 
recognize customary rights to forest and land, and limit IPs and communities’ rights to user 388 
and access rights (Alemagi & Kozak, 2010; Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2014). Moreover, both 389 
land and forestry laws attribute the ownership of valuable forest resources to the state 390 
(Mbatu, 2015) and do not specify whether carbon ownership is associated with rights over 391 
trees. Thus, a significant amount of the country’s forest carbon is state-owned. To address 392 
the given inadequacies, the R-PP (MINEPDED, 2013, p. 63) proposes the development of a 393 
national land-use plan and improvements to the existing land tenure law. Finally, whilst the 394 
VPA and REDD+ processes aim for the recognition of access or use rights, the FGDs in six 395 
villages revealed that IPs and communities would like to have, in addition to access right, legal 396 
rights of management and exclusion, which are considered necessary to sustainably use 397 
natural resources (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 398 
4.1.3. Social benefits and benefit sharing 399 
The effectiveness of the FLEGT and REDD+ processes will depend on, for example, their ability 400 
to equitably distribute benefits to the relevant stakeholders (Chomba et al., 2016; Dunlop & 401 
Corbera, 2016; Somorin et al., 2014). The benefits can be shared between national and local 402 
stakeholders (vertical distribution) and between and within a community (horizontal 403 
distribution). The Cameroonian VPA refers to benefit sharing mechanisms (BSMs) as a part of 404 
social obligations. A provision on how to develop a BSMs under the VPA is quite weak and is 405 
not further elaborated in the Cameroonian VPA. An interviewee from a governmental 406 
organization noted that ‘Cameroon has a functioning forest revenue-distribution model 407 
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[called Annual Forest Royalties (AFR; Redevance Forestière Annuelle)] based on the 1994 408 
forestry law and the same system will be adopted under the VPA process’. If adopted, this will 409 
imply that the VPA is primarily targeting the vertical distribution of benefits. Twenty-six out 410 
of 37 interviewees, mainly from CSOs and international organizations, expressed their fear 411 
that the VPA could reinforce the effectiveness, efficiency and equity problems inherent in 412 
AFR, which suffers from high transaction costs and has failed to achieve poverty reduction 413 
and local development (Assembe-mvondo et al., 2015; Mbatu, 2015). The same group of 414 
interviewees also said that although the implementation of the VPA itself will not bring new 415 
social benefits (e.g. make a contribution to local development) to IPs and communities, they 416 
stressed that the VPA could improve compliance with the law and the relationship between 417 
logging companies and the communities.  418 
Like the VPA process, the REDD+ process has not yet developed BSMs although it does lay out 419 
some initial steps. The R-PP (MINEPDED, 2013, p. 76) presents two levels of payments: vertical 420 
and horizontal distribution of benefits. The R-PP (p. 76) proposes basing the BSMs on the 421 
experiences of other in-country revenue distribution models, notably AFR, which has 422 
contributed to the marginalization of IPs such as Baka forest peoples. In the same vein, the 423 
World Bank’s FCPF requires that distributions of financial benefits from its Carbon Fund 424 
should occur in the context of a national BSMs, but exact arrangement are not specified 425 
(Cadman et al., 2016, p. 3). During all the FGDs, IPs and local communities blamed AFR for 426 
bureaucratic red tape and poor governance. A participant in FGDs in Ndimako noted that 427 
‘when AFR incentives reach our village, the incentives have often been mismanaged by local 428 
elite and traditional authorities. It is quite common for the incentives go to the Bantu farming 429 
peoples and not to Baka indigenous forest peoples’. This assertion corroborates similar 430 
findings by Freudenthal et al. (2011). Finally, MINEPDED (2013) identifies IPs and local 431 
communities as the primary beneficiaries of the REDD+ benefits, and also states that the 432 
participation of stakeholders in decision making is indispensable, but does not identify the 433 
form of participation. Thus, our analysis shows that the business-as-usual proposals for the 434 
BSMs under REDD+ and VPA processes in Cameroon will reinforce the injustices inherited in 435 
the AFR and existing legal systems. Unless this situation is rectified, IPs and local communities 436 
will have no motivation to actively engage in the processes. 437 
4.2 Monitoring and reporting commitments on social safeguards 438 
To ensure that it can effectively comply with the international safeguard standards, and 439 
report that compliance, a country should assess the existing monitoring and reporting tools 440 
and procedures of other relevant processes and initiatives being implemented in the country. 441 
Understanding the different monitoring and reporting procedures could help countries 442 
identify common reporting guidelines, methodologies and best practices for gathering 443 
information and reporting on compliances (Korwin and Rey, 2015). Here, we assess and 444 
compare the monitoring and reporting obligations under the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ 445 
processes. 446 
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Under the VPA process, commitments to monitoring are more elaborate in comparison to 447 
commitments to reporting. The VPA impact monitoring framework (which is under 448 
development) will monitor the environmental, social and economic impacts of the VPA, and 449 
thus the social safeguards (Tegegne et al., 2014). The Cameroon VPA mandates the JIC to 450 
implement the legally-binding monitoring commitment and to undertake annual reporting on 451 
VPA impact monitoring, including that on social aspects. It is assumed that when they are 452 
available, the reports, documents and conclusions of the VPA impact monitoring will made 453 
public on the internet. Moreover, Cameroon is the first Central African country to have an 454 
independent forest monitor, whose roles include strengthening the monitoring capacities of 455 
MINFOF, improving existing monitoring tools and adapting the monitoring tools to the 456 
requirements of the FLEGT-VPA TLAS (Brack & Léger, 2013, p.15). The VPA process recognizes 457 
a continuing role for the independent forest monitor, listing the ‘independent observation’ 458 
involving local civil society for monitoring and reporting on, inter alia, compliance with 459 
existing regulations, which is of relevance to REDD+. 460 
The REDD+ policy documents refer to both the monitoring and the reporting of social 461 
safeguard related aspects. Cameroon’s proposed solution to monitoring and reporting on 462 
social safeguards in its REDD+ process is through the development of SESA. However, there is 463 
insufficient detail about the criteria and indicators to be adopted in monitoring and reporting 464 
on social safeguards in REDD+ in the country. Rather, it is assumed that indicator frameworks 465 
for governance and social impacts developed in other national and international processes 466 
and/or projects will be used. In this context, a direct linkage is made to the criteria and 467 
indicators developed in the context of the FLEGT-VPA (MINEPDED, 2013).  468 
4.3. Similarities and differences between social safeguard approaches 469 
A comparison of the safeguard approaches of the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes revealed 470 
important similarities. First, there is similarity in the nature of developing benefit sharing 471 
mechanisms, strengthening forest and land tenure, and monitoring and reporting. This is 472 
because both processes in Cameroon (i) promise to conduct a multi-stakeholder approach, 473 
(ii) rely on existing legal and institutional systems, and (iii) plan to develop criteria and 474 
indicator based monitoring and reporting frameworks. Second, both processes consider the 475 
preventive and mitigative roles of safeguards. Third, FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ share common 476 
social concerns. During the interviews, three important social risks and potential synergies 477 
were frequently mentioned, namely (in order of importance): i) strengthening the tenure 478 
rights of IPs and communities, ii) improving forest governance, including the reform of laws 479 
and stakeholder engagement, and iii) benefit sharing. However, the importance attached to 480 
social risks differed between the experts interviewed and the participants in the FGDs. The 481 
latter ranked social benefits and benefit sharing as the most important concern, followed by 482 
land and forest tenure and participation in decision making processes. Fourth, section 4.1 483 
shows that both processes will lead to social safeguard mechanisms that are based on 484 
outdated national laws, which do not recognize customary rights and limit the active 485 
engagement of forest-dependent communities. The observed similarities in social safeguards 486 
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can be attributed to the common origins of safeguards and the overlaps in the policy goals of 487 
FLEGT Action Plan, FCPF and UN-REDD, and the general trend and pressure from CSOs to 488 
emphasize similar issues in all processes. The similarities can also be attributed to recent 489 
trends in bilateral and multilateral policy processes to develop and use criteria and indicators 490 
for monitoring, reporting and verifying results and impacts. 491 
Our analysis also revealed important differences. First, in REDD+, social safeguard compliance 492 
is a prerequisite for result-based incentives; under the VPA it is a legal obligation and linked 493 
to market access. Second, while the VPA mainly includes plans for the vertical distribution of 494 
benefits, REDD+ considers both vertical and horizontal sharing of benefits. Third, membership 495 
of IPs in the REDD+ steering committee is a right, which is not the case with the FLEGT-VPA 496 
process. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, although neither the FLEGT Action Plan nor 497 
the VPA elaborates the details of social safeguards, several mechanisms and options are 498 
under consideration in the REDD+ safeguards framework. The differences uncovered can be 499 
attributed to the different designs and approaches of the two processes. Unlike REDD+, which 500 
is the result of a multilateral process, national and regional (EU) stakeholders define the scope 501 
of the VPA (see also Wodschow et al., 2016). During the VPA negotiations in Cameroon, 502 
stakeholders regarded the FLEGT-VPA as an agreement aimed at improving governance and 503 
alleviating poverty. In this context, and with a view to addressing the negative unintended 504 
effects that could arise, the article on social safeguards and commitment to VPA impact 505 
monitoring was included in the Cameroon VPA agreement. REDD+ is different, as actors tend 506 
to be concerned that it is not being developed to improve governance and reduce poverty, 507 
and so the focus is much more on including social safeguards. 508 
5. Discussion 509 
In this section, we discuss synergies in the social safeguards of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+, the 510 
main challenges to realizing the synergies, and the policy implications of the key findings of 511 
the study. 512 
5.1. Synergies 513 
Our analysis shows that although FLEGT and REDD+ originated in different environmental 514 
governance arenas, there are potential synergies between the social safeguard approaches 515 
of the processes. First, there is crucial synergy to be realized in the multi-stakeholder nature 516 
of developing benefit sharing mechanisms, strengthening forest and land tenure, and defining 517 
criteria and indicators in relation to FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ safeguards. Realizing these 518 
synergies will have the advantage of what Tegegne et al. (2014) and Ochieng et al. (2013) 519 
have referred to as ‘transfer of commitments’. For instance, under the VPA, Cameroon 520 
committed itself to undertaking a reform of regulatory frameworks to harmonize existing laws 521 
with the TLAS requirements; under REDD+, the country committed itself to clarifying rights 522 
and mechanisms for sharing benefits. Thus, Cameroon can fulfil both commitments using the 523 
resources from only one of the processes.  524 
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Second, FLEGT and REDD+ have features that could complement each other in addressing the 525 
gaps in the protection of IPs’ and communities’ rights and benefits. The Cameroon VPA 526 
promotes independent third-party monitoring and has been providing financial and technical 527 
support for the participation of civil society in reporting and monitoring (Brack and Léger, 528 
2013). Hence, CSOs in Cameroon have been carrying out ‘self-mandated’ monitoring and 529 
reporting, identifying cases of illegal practices at the community level, and providing on-the-530 
ground evidence that is crucial to ensuring the effective monitoring of forest governance and 531 
compliance with forest regulations. These experiences of CSOs could provide important 532 
lessons for the inclusion of civil society in the design and implementation of REDD+’s social 533 
safeguards and benefit sharing mechanisms. All these will go a long way to providing the 534 
country’s safeguards systems with legitimacy, effectiveness and credibility.  535 
Third, the development of a legality definition in the context of the VPA includes a 536 
comprehensive gap analysis of relevant national polices, laws and regulations. The results of 537 
this assessment will be useful when developing the safeguard information system (SIS) for 538 
REDD+.  539 
Fourth, the VPA’s transparency annex lays out the government’s promise to make public 540 
information that is of relevance to the monitoring and reporting of REDD+ safeguards and the 541 
‘informed’ principle of FPIC. In this context, one of the CSOs, FODER, is drawing on its FLEGT 542 
experience from the Championing Forest People’s Rights and Participation (EU-CFPR) project 543 
to initiate discussions and propose the development of the REDD+ transparency guide in 544 
Cameroon. In addition, REDD+’s FPIC guideline could be used by VPA actors when engaging 545 
with stakeholders and allocating forest concessions.  546 
Finally, there are synergies between monitoring and reporting tools and procedures, as well 547 
as gathering baseline information on compliance (see also Ochieng et al., 2013). A crucial 548 
purpose of VPA impact monitoring is to assess and report changes related to such topics as 549 
the effective engagement of stakeholders, tenure and rights, and distribution of benefits 550 
(Tegegne et al., 2014). VPA’s TLAS also include several requirements for monitoring and 551 
reporting on-the-ground legal compliance, independent third-party monitoring and 552 
companies’ social obligations. Much of this information is particularly relevant for REDD+ SIS. 553 
5.2. Challenges to realizing the synergies 554 
Despite the potential synergies, our analysis points to several challenges to realizing them. 555 
The first challenge is the lack of domestic political will in Cameroon to devote resources and 556 
efforts to the synergetic implementation of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ policies (see also Karsenty 557 
& Ongolo, 2012). The lack of political interest can partly be explained by the recent shift in 558 
Cameroon’s vision and political priorities towards becoming an emerging economy by 2035. 559 
This vision pays little attention to environmental sustainability and entails, amongst other 560 
things, the development of large-scale agriculture, investments in infrastructure and the 561 
mining of minerals such as cobalt, diamonds, gold and iron ore. These developments imply a 562 
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decreasing importance of the EU timber market and the growing trade with Asia (Wodschow 563 
et al., 2016).  564 
The second challenge is the complex vested interest of political and economic elites in the 565 
country’s existing governance system. ‘Those who have interest in the existing system are 566 
those who are governing the system, so they would like to keep the status quo of contradictory 567 
policy implementation and thus preserve scope for personal agendas’ noted an interviewee 568 
from an international organization. This sentiment echoes recent research on the topic: 569 
Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014), Foundjem-Tita et al. (2014), Nkemnyi et al. (2016)and Ongolo 570 
(2015) observed that elites in Cameroon have a strong interest in maintaining an incoherent 571 
and uncoordinated status quo. Given these interests, seeking synergies between the 572 
safeguard systems of FLEGT and REDD+ and any legal reforms in Cameroon seem unlikely. In 573 
the same vein, any possible changes and reforms will likely not be useful in securing the rights 574 
of IPs and local communities without addressing how the system favours the vested interests. 575 
This limits the democratic space of IPs and local communities to exert influence on the final 576 
outcomes of the policy processes. Vested interest is also a common obstacle to realizing 577 
synergies in other countries participating in both FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes, such as 578 
Ghana (Hajjar, 2015), Republic of Congo (Tegegne, 2016) and Indonesia (Brockhaus et al., 579 
2014). 580 
The third challenge is the lack of coordination – accompanied by conflicting interests – 581 
between and within governmental agencies, national CSOs as well as global proponents and 582 
donors of FLEGT and REDD+. Among governmental agencies, a crucial obstacle is the 583 
conflicting leadership between the two implementing ministries: MINEPDED (overseeing the 584 
country’s REDD+ process) and MINFOF (the main custodian of the country’s forests). This 585 
conflictual leadership calls into question the capacity of the VPA and REDD+ processes to 586 
operate effectively and serve as levers for safeguarding the right of IPs and communities. At 587 
the international (and also the national) level, FLEGT and REDD+ are two separate processes 588 
under two disconnected proponents (e.g. the UNFCCC and the World Bank versus the EU). 589 
Relevant policy documents of the global proponents lack cross-referencing on related 590 
instruments of the processes. For example, as noted by an interviewee: ‘REDD+ actors in 591 
Cameroon have focused on developing an MRV system. MRV is being constructed as a system 592 
completely separated from the FLEGT-VPA’s TLAS and according to general criteria provided 593 
by the World Bank, which do not make any link to the FLEGT-VPA TLAS.’ In addition, the 594 
synergy approach to policy processes is itself an emerging issue even at the international 595 
level, and it has not yet found its way into national and subnational policies and strategies 596 
(Duguma et al, 2014). Interviews support this viewpoint. ‘Seeking synergies between FLEGT 597 
and REDD+ is very much an internationally driven agenda (in particular by the EU)’ stated an 598 
interviewee from a governmental organization. A further challenge is ‘strong division and 599 
conflicts among national CSOs and intra-community between those favouring conservation or 600 
conversion’ noted an interviewee from CSOs. This sentiment corroborates similar findings by 601 
Ongolo (2015), Alemagi and Kozak (2010) and Wodschow et al. (2016). Such competition 602 
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hampers the ability of non-state actors and hinders collective action to influence the policy 603 
elites and advocate for coherent policy implementation. 604 
A fourth challenge is the lack of technical knowledge and information about the safeguards 605 
of FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ among stakeholder groups. Cameroon, just like many other 606 
countries, is yet to generate adequate data and information to inform and report on the 607 
development and implementation of a national SIS. Finally, there is no defined financial 608 
mechanism for efforts promoting and implementing synergies at the subnational, national 609 
and global levels. This may lead to a situation in which those involved will see it as a waste of 610 
time, limiting their chances to get separate and more funding and not serving their personal 611 
interest or that of their institution.  612 
5.3. Policy implications 613 
First, while country safeguard systems should build on existing governance arrangements to 614 
respond effectively to safeguards commitments in a rigorous yet flexible manner, our analysis 615 
shows otherwise in Cameroon. The existing national policies, laws and regulations have 616 
several weaknesses and are not supporting Cameroon in fully addressing the safeguard 617 
requirements of UNFCCC, FCPF and UN-REDD. Cameroon has historically been characterized 618 
by inefficient and weak governance institutions (Mbatu, 2015). In this light, we argue that 619 
without effective dialogue and the reforms needed to meet the required social safeguard 620 
commitments, there is a real danger that investments of UN-REDD, the World Bank and the 621 
EU through the REDD+ and VPA processes will serve to reinforce outdated regulatory 622 
frameworks and could even result in human rights violations during REDD+ implementation. 623 
It is therefore crucial that the ministries involved, REDD+ proponents, communities, CSOs, 624 
and international organizations and donors take appropriate steps to ensure that relevant 625 
legislative and subnational and project-based actions are taken to reduce any potential 626 
negative consequences. 627 
Second, considering the current approaches to governance and legality, neither FLEGT-VPA 628 
nor REDD+ will effectively address the key social concerns identified in this study: inefficient 629 
stakeholder engagement, tenure insecurity and inequitable sharing of benefits. One of the 630 
weaknesses of the FLEGT-VPA is that it bases its design on existing regulatory frameworks, 631 
which is vital for national ownership and legitimacy (Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014; 632 
Wiersum and Elands, 2013). According to van Heeswijk & Turnhout (2013), FLEGT is shaped 633 
by state-oriented discourses that promote existing regulatory instruments that may not 634 
necessarily promote sustainability and effective participation. In practice, however, this 635 
approach has so far not worked well in Cameroon. An example is Cameroon’s forestry and 636 
land tenure laws, which aggravate the conflicts between customary and formal law (Mbatu, 637 
2015; Nkemnyi et al., 2016). Alemagi & Kozak (2010, p. 558) also noted that the existing 638 
regulatory frameworks in Cameroon have served to ‘usurp property rights of forest 639 
communities’. It is interesting to observe that REDD+ (whose design is not based on existing 640 
national law) has not provided strong provisions to resolve problems associated with land 641 
tenure and, more interestingly, has not discussed forest carbon rights, which appear to be 642 
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attributed to the state. The results of case studies in Cameroon also indicate that resolving 643 
tenure insecurity under REDD+ and the current political economy of the country will prove 644 
difficult (Cerbu et al., 2013; Nkemnyi et al., 2016; Sunderlin et al., 2014). During the six FGDs 645 
in south and east Cameroon, IPs and local communities showed concern about tenure 646 
insecurity and pointed out that addressing the tenure problem will be a challenging task. This 647 
is because, for example, ‘the existing tenure arrangement gives privileged access to forest 648 
resources to powerful elites’ (an FGD participant in Nomedjoh village). Assessing the 649 
effectiveness of Cameroon’s REDD+ policy strategy, Mbatu (2015, p. 54) states that “access 650 
and tenure in Cameroon's forests have been an issue of confrontation between the 651 
government of Cameroon and its peoples for decades”. The unresolved uncertainty about land 652 
tenure and ownership rights could erode the legitimacy of FLEGT and REDD+, and cast a 653 
shadow of doubt over the rights of IPs and local communities to carbon ownership and their 654 
active participation in the processes. Our analysis supports similar findings by Cerbu et al. 655 
(2013), Hajjar (2015) and Movuh (2012), who concluded that without effective and inclusive 656 
reform of tenure law and a change in incentive structures, FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes 657 
are not likely to succeed. 658 
Third, the two main tools providing guidance for the development of safeguards in the Congo 659 
Basin (FCPF and UN-REDD) require that the rights and needs of IPs and local communities be 660 
met to ensure the sustainable success of FLEGT and REDD+. Nonetheless, there is an 661 
important discrepancy between the needs of forest-dependent communities and the 662 
proposed safeguard approaches (Table 4). During the fieldwork, IPs and communities 663 
explicitly mentioned the need to have management and exclusion rights and a mechanism for 664 
the equitable sharing of benefits. They would also like to be grantor of FPIC and have 665 
promotive safeguards in addition to the preventive and mitigative safeguards planned in the 666 
policy documents of FLEGT and REDD+. As discussed in section 4.1, none of these needs and 667 
expectations of IPs will be effectively addressed and respected during FLEGT and REDD+ 668 
implementation in Cameroon if the processes continue with the proposed plan for designing 669 
and implementing safeguard systems. 670 
Fourth, building a robust and flexible safeguard system that address the abovementioned 671 
concerns will need careful thinking and planning that integrates multiple objectives, at both 672 
the national and the international level. At the national level, policies and their interplay 673 
across the ministries in charge of forests (MINFOF), REDD+ (MINEPDED), indigenous peoples 674 
(MINAS) and regional planning (MINEPAT) will need to be considered. We argue that a 675 
national safeguard system in Cameroon and other Congo Basin countries, such as the Republic 676 
of Congo, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, which are all engaged 677 
in FLEGT, could build on subnational level experiences related to FLEGT and REDD+. A unique 678 
opportunity is the emissions reduction program (ERP), which in some cases, like in Cameroon, 679 
is focused on areas where logging and the FLEGT process are happening. In practice, this 680 
means that both FLEGT and ERP issues affecting communities should be addressed. This 681 
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includes land use planning, consultation and participation, benefit sharing arrangements, and 682 
respecting the rights of communities and indigenous peoples. 683 
At the international level, Cameroon and other countries are expected to use data and 684 
knowledge generated from the ERP, other REDD+ and FLEGT activities to design and develop 685 
a comprehensive national SIS, inform safeguard-related issues and policies over time, and 686 
report to the UNFCCC and EU how safeguards are being implemented and respected. This 687 
implies that the governments of Cameroon and other developing countries are expected to 688 
design ERPs that have a strong safeguard component that meets or exceeds the requirements 689 
of not only World Bank safeguard standards but also the UNFCCC Cancun decisions on 690 
safeguards, as well as safeguards issues linked to FLEGT. Otherwise, Cameroon, just like any 691 
other country engaged in REDD+, will not be able to access REDD+ result-based financing 692 
easily at the international level. With the discouraging carbon price in the carbon market, 693 
coupled with an excessive supply of REDD+ credits and limited financing from the markets 694 
and donors, REDD+ credits that have strong safeguards credentials may become more 695 
attractive for buyers and donors. Furthermore, UNFCCC negotiations and subsequent 696 
decisions on safeguards during COP in Warsaw (2013) and Paris (2015) sent a clear signal from 697 
developed countries to developing countries that the implementation and respect of 698 
safeguards remain a top priority and prerequisite for REDD+ payments.  699 
5. Conclusions 700 
This paper has presented a comparison of the social safeguard approaches of the FLEGT-VPA 701 
and REDD+ processes and explored the potential synergies and the challenges to realizing 702 
these synergies in Cameroon. The FLEGT-VPA adopts legality-based safeguards with legally 703 
binding monitoring and reporting obligations, whereas REDD+ mainly takes a right-based 704 
approach to safeguards. Consultation is the defining form of participation in both processes. 705 
REDD+ proposes to develop both vertical and horizontal benefit sharing arrangements, 706 
whereas the aim of the VPA is to primarily target the vertical distribution of benefits. Potential 707 
synergies exist in the participatory nature of the process of designing benefit sharing 708 
mechanisms, strengthening forest and land tenure, and defining the criteria and indicators in 709 
relation to FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ safeguards. However, realizing the synergies is challenging 710 
given the existing political economy of Cameroon. 711 
Our analysis has also shown that the planned safeguards of neither FLEGT-VPA nor REDD+ will 712 
in practice be able to effectively safeguard IPs and local communities. There is rather a real risk 713 
that associated funding from the World Bank, UN-REDD and the EU will likely serve the vested 714 
interests of powerful individuals in Cameroon. One possible solution to this problem is an 715 
overhaul of the land tenure and forestry laws. This conclusion is consistent with that of Mbatu 716 
(2015)and Tieguhong et al. (2015). In this regard, a key synergetic point between FLEGT-VPA 717 
and REDD+ safeguards is participatory governance reform to clarify the rights to land and 718 
natural resources. Given the weak governance in Cameroon, it is essential that the FLEGT and 719 
REDD+ actors, CSOs and donors take appropriate steps to ensure that such reform processes 720 
adhere to the joint FCPF and UN-REDD+ guidelines on stakeholder engagement and serve the 721 
23 
 
interests of IPs and local communities, rather than powerful elites. In addition, the actors 722 
must listen to and act on the concerns and constructive proposals of IPs and local 723 
communities and ensure their active participation, according to the principles of FPIC. By so 724 
doing, a safeguard system and benefit sharing mechanisms that are regarded by stakeholders 725 
as effective and equitable can be developed, and this in turn will promote the sustainability 726 
and legitimacy of FLEGT and REDD+ processes. Finally, the insights from our analysis can 727 
support the development of a way forward for those stakeholders that are willing to realize 728 
and contribute to synergetic links between the FLEGT-VPA and the REDD+ safeguards. 729 
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